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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to 78-2-2(3)(j) Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1988). 
This appeal is taken from a final order entered by the Fourth 
Judicial District Court of Millard County, Utah, the Honorable 
Ray M. Harding presiding, in which the Dewsnups' Motion to 
either Reconsider and Set Aside the Summary Judgment or to 
Certify the Summary Judgment as Final and the Dewsnups' Motion 
to Amend their Counterclaim was denied. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues on appeal are as stated by the 
Appellants. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Although in cases involving conclusions of law by a 
Trial Court the Appeals Court reviews the decision under a 
correction-of-error standard, the Appeals Court may affirm the 
Trial Court's decision on any proper ground(s), despite the 
Trial Court's assigning another reason for its ruling. 
Buehner Block Company v. UWC Associates. 752 P2d. 892, 895 
(Utah 1988). See also Global Recreation v. Cedar Hills 
Development, 614 P2d. 155 (Utah 1980). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Dewsnups' Statement of the Case does not 
accurately reflect either the nature of this case or the 
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status of the proceedings in the lower court. This appeal 
does not as the Dewsnups urge, represent the only chance to 
tell the story of their ten-year long struggle. In fact, the 
Dewsnups have presented their story to two Utah District Court 
Judges, a United States Bankruptcy Judge, a Federal District 
Court Judge, the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
and they are presently presenting their story to the United 
States Supreme Court. In reality, this case involves the 
attempt of Plaintiff's to collect on a valid Trust Deed Note 
secured by a Trust Deed executed by the Dewsnups more than 13 
years ago, which the Dewsnups failed to pay. 
In 1978/ the Dewsnups executed a Trust Deed and a 
Trust Deed Note together with an Assignment of Contract in 
favor of Plaintiffs. The documents were executed in 
consideration of Plaintiffs loan to the Dewsnups of 
$119,000.00. When the Dewsnups failed to make payments due on 
the Notes the Plaintiffs brought suit against the Dewsnups 
asking for a Money Judgment and Order foreclosing the 
collateral given to secure the Dewsnups payment of the debt. 
The Dewsnups, through counsel, filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim. In 1981, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for 
Summary Judgment. After notice and a Hearing before Judge 
Burns the Plaintiffs Motion was granted in its entirety and 
Summary Judgment was entered. 
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More than ten years later Aletha Dewsnup filed a 
Motion to Reconsider and Set Aside Summary Judgment or Certify 
the Summary Judgment as Final and a Motion to Amend the 
Dewsnups' Counterclaim. After reviewing the file in this case 
and the written arguments from both sides, Judge Harding 
denied the Dewsnup#s Motions. 
Plaintiffs strongly object to the Dewsnup's 
allegations and contentions in their statement of the case 
totally unsupported by the record of these proceedings. Said 
allegations are in fact unsupportable, because they are not 
true. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts delineated in the Dewsnup's Brief are both 
misleading and in violation of the Courts rules relating to 
Statements of Fact. Many of Appellants Statement of Alleged 
Facts are unsupported by the record. Several of the 
Appellant's statements are particularly offensive in that in 
addition to being totally unsupported by factual averment in 
the record they by innuendo make false allegations concerning 
a member of the State Bar. 
First, the Dewsnups' Statement of Fact number 2 
states that Joseph Henriod was the Dewsnup's attorney when 
they approached him in 1978 about a loan. This is not true. 
The only pages of the record referred to by the Dewsnups to 
substantiate this fact are merely two pages of the Dewsnups' 
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Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Amend their 
Counterclaim. Second, the Dewsnups contend in Statement of 
Fact number 23 that Joseph Henriod told the Dewsnups in 
approximately September of 1980 that he could no longer be 
their lawyer and recommended a lawyer in Provo. Again this is 
not true and the only portion of the record referred to by the 
Dewsnups to support this claimed fact is the Memorandum filed 
by the Dewsnups' attorney in Support of their Motion to Amend 
their Counterclaim. Plaintiffs' believe that the above 
referenced Statements of Fact by the Dewsnups misrepresent the 
record and are a violation of Rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
Plaintiffs submit that the following Statement of 
Facts represents the relevant facts that are established by 
the record in this case. 
1. On June 1, 1978, the Dewsnups borrowed $119,000 
from the Plaintiffs, namely the Annette Jacob Trust, The 
United Precision Machine and Engineering Company Profit 
Sharing Trust and Abco Insurance Agency, Inc. (R. 8, 9, 10.). 
2. The Dewsnups executed three Promissory Notes in 
favor of the Plaintiffs totalling $119,000 (R. 8, 9, 10.). 
3. At the same time the Dewsnups executed a Trust 
Deed and Amended Trust Deed (collectively the "Trust Deed") to 
secure the Promissory Notes (R. 133-143). 
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4. As additional security for the Promissory 
Notes, the Dewsnups executed an Assignment of Contract (the 
"Assignment of Contract") assigning to the Plaintiffs their 
interest as purchasers in a uniform real estate contract (the 
"Purchase Contract") (R. 11-13). 
5. The Dewsnups failed to make the 1980 annual 
installment payment on the "Purchase Contract" and failed to 
pay the 1979 property taxes when due. On June 7, 1980, the 
Plaintiff's made the "Purchase Contract" payment and paid the 
taxes owing on the property (R.2,69,70). 
6. On June 1, 1980, the $119,000 loan came due. 
The Dewsnups did not pay off the loan on June 1, 1980, and 
subsequently on September 16, 1980, the Plaintiffs filed their 
Complaint against the Dewsnups (R. 1-7). 
7 • The Dewsnups retained attorney, Robert Fillerup 
who filed an Answer and Counterclaim on November 21, 1980 (R. 
59-63). The Answer and Counterclaim is attached as Exhibit 
"A" herein. 
8. In December 1980, the Dewsnups paid some, but 
not all, of the amounts due Plaintiffs. Subsequently on March 
3, 1981, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Summary Judgment 
accompanied by the Affidavit of Louis Timm (R. 66-70). 
9. The Motion for Summary Judgment was noticed for 
oral argument and Judgment was granted by Judge Burns on April 
14, 1981 (R. 74). 
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10. A copy of the proposed Summary Judgment was 
mailed to Robert Fillerup, the Dewsnups' attorney on April 16, 
1981 (R. 79). 
11. Judge Burns signed the Summary Judgment and 
Decree of Foreclosure on April 22, 1981, and it was filed on 
April 24, 1981. (R. 75-79). 
12. On April 23, 1981, the Dewsnups filed a Chapter 
11 Bankruptcy No. 81-01367. Their Bankruptcy was dismissed on 
April 1, 1982. (R. 218). 
13. On August 17, 1982, the Dewsnups filed a second 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy No. 82C-02046. On February 13, 1984, 
this Bankruptcy was dismissed with prejudice by Judge Glen E. 
Clark. (R. 219). 
14. On June 27, 1984, the Dewsnups filed a Chapter 
7 Bankruptcy No. 84C-01746 which is still pending. (R. 84 
219). 
15. On March 3, 1987, seven years after Judge 
Burns' decision, the Dewsnups filed an Amended Complaint in 
Federal Bankruptcy Court, to determine the validity of 
Plaintiffs lien on the property that is the subject matter of 
this lawsuit. (R. 227-234). A copy of the Complaint is 
attached as Exhibit "B" herein. 
16. The Dewsnups' First Cause of Action in their 
Bankruptcy Complaint alleges that the notes secured by the 
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Plaintiff's Trust Deed have been paid in full and that the 
Trust Deed should be ordered removed. (R. 228, 229). 
17. On June 24, 1987, a trial was held on the 
Dewsnups' Complaint before Judge Glen E. Clark. (R. 219). 
18. On June 15, 1988, Judge Clark issued a 
Memorandum Opinion dismissing the Dewsnups' Complaint. (R. 
262-281). 
19. On August 15, 1988, Judge Clark entered a 
Judgment dismissing with prejudice Plaintiffs' Complaint in 
its entirety. (R. 283-284). A copy of Judge Clarks' Order is 
attached as Exhibit HC" herein. 
20. The Dewsnups appealed Judge Clark's decision to 
the Federal District Court and an Order was entered by Judge 
J. Thomas Green Jr. on March 15, 1989, affirming Judge Clark's 
dismissal of the Dewsnup's Complaint. (R. 220). 
21. The Dewsnups then appealed Judge Green's 
decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. On July 11, 
1990, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals filed its decision 
affirming the dismissal of the Dewsnup's Complaint. (R. 220) 
22. The Dewsnups requested that the United States 
Supreme Court grant a Writ of Certiorari to review the 
decision of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Writ was 
subsequently granted. The case has been briefed by all 
parties and is now presently set for oral argument on October 
15, 1991. (Note: At the time of Judge Harding's ruling 
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denying the Dewsnups Motions that are the subject of this 
appeal, the United States Supreme Court had not yet granted 
the Writ of Certiorari.) 
23. Since the filing of the Complaint in this case 
the Dewsnups have been represented in either this case or 
their bankruptcy proceedings by at least six (6) different 
attorneys. (R. 59, 84, 86, 219, 220, 283.) 
24. On January 6, 1991, based on a request for 
abandonment signed by the Dewsnups newest attorney the 
Bankruptcy Trustee abandoned the Dewsnups' Counterclaim. (R. 
105.) 
25. On January 28, 1991, the Dewsnups filed a 
Motion to Amend their Counterclaim. (R. 194-207.) 
26. On January 25, 1991, the Dewsnups filed a 
Motion to Reconsider and Set Aside or to Certify as Final. 
(R. 107-109.) 
27. On February 21, 1991, Judge Ray M. Harding 
issued a Memorandum Decision denying the Dewsnups' Motions. 
(R. 348-349.) 
28. On March 11, 1991, Judge Ray M. Harding signed 
an Order Denying the Dewsnups' Motion to Amend Counterclaim, 
Reconsider or Certify as Final. (R. 350-351.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
As a general principle of law this Court has always 
held that a Judge's decision in allowing or denying Motions 
before him is a matter left up to his sound discretion. For 
this reason a Judge's decision to grant or deny motions of 
this type will only be overturned based upon a clear abuse of 
that discretion. 
Judge Harding's Denial of the Dewsnup's Motions was 
within his discretion and is sustainable by this Court on 
several grounds. 
First, the Dewsnup's Counterclaim could not be 
amended because it had been disposed of more than ten years 
prior to the filing of their Motion to Amend. Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment alleged that there remained no 
disputed material facts in the case before the Court. The 
granting of Plaintiffs Summary Judgment by Judge Burns was in 
complete contradiction to the relief requested by the 
Dewsnups. The Dewsnup's Counterclaim requested a reformation 
of the Trust Deed and the voiding by the Court of the 
Assignment of the Dewsnup's Purchase Contract. Judge Burns' 
granting of the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
acknowledged the validity of the Trust Deed and ordered the 
Dewsnup's interest in the Purchase Contract foreclosed. Judge 
Burns simply could not have entered the Summary Judgment 
foreclosing the Dewsnups interest in the Purchase Contract if 
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a question of fact remained as to the validity of the 
assignment. 
Second, had Judge Harding granted the Dewsnups' 
Motion to Amend their Counterclaim it would have resulted in 
prejudice to the Plaintiffs. If in fact the Dewsnups' 
Counterclaim remained viable after the Summary Judgment, the 
Dewsnups allowed it to be dormant for a period of almost 
eleven years. During this time the Judge signing the Summary 
Judgment retired and Lamar Dewsnup died. The Dewsnups' claims 
have become so stale that any requested reincarnation would be 
prejudicial to the Plaintiffs per se. 
Third, the issues presented by the Dewsnups in their 
proposed Counterclaim were tried and dismissed with prejudice 
by Judge Glen E. Clark of the United States Bankruptcy Court 
for the District of Utah. The Dismissal by Judge Clark of the 
Dewsnup's claims is res judicata and bars the Dewsnups from 
now bringing the same claims in the Utah District Court as 
well as claims that should have been, but were not, brought 
before Judge Clark. 
The Dewsnups' Motion to Reconsider and Set Aside or 
Certify as Final the Summary Judgment was properly denied by 
Judge Harding. Judge Harding correctly ruled that the 
Dewsnup 's Motion to Reconsider and Set Aside or Certify as 
Final does not exist under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE DEWSNUPS' COUNTERCLAIM WAS ADJUDICATED WHEN 
JUDGE BURNS ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS 
A. Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
does not apply to the facts present in this case, 
Plaintiff's Complaint requested a determination by 
the trial Court of amounts owed on the notes executed by the 
Dewsnups' and for an Order of the Court foreclosing 
Plaintiff's security interest pursuant to the assignment of 
the Purchase Contract. 
The Dewsnups' Answer and Counterclaim alleged that 
the Assignment of the Purchase Contract was unknowingly and 
unwittingly signed by the Dewsnups and further, that part of 
the property covered by the Trust Deed was improperly included 
in the Trust Deed. As a result of the foregoing, the Dewsnups 
asked that the Assignment of the Purchase Contract be vacated 
and the Trust Deed reformed. 
Judge Burns' Summary Judgment established the amount 
owed on the notes, and found that the Trust Deed and 
Assignment of the Purchase Contract secured the Notes and 
ordered the Dewsnups interest in the Purchase Contract 
foreclosed. The relief granted by Judge Burns was so 
completely incompatible with the relief requested by the 
Dewsnups in their Counterclaim as to render their claim that 
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the Counterclaim is still viable, meaningless. This is so 
because it would have been impossible for Judge Burns to order 
the foreclosure of the Dewsnups interest in the Purchase 
Contract and acknowledge the Trust Deed as additional security 
for the notes if there remained a question of fact concerning 
the validity of the same security interests that he was 
ordering foreclosed. 
The Dewsnups reliance on Lamp v. Andrus, 657 F2d 
1167 (10th Cir. 1981) is misplaced. The Lamp decision did not 
involve a Counterclaim where the relief sought was reformation 
of the instruments that the Plaintiffs were seeking to 
foreclose. The Lamp Counterclaim was truly a separate cause 
of action that required a ruling independent of the 
Plaintiff's Claims. The Dewsnup Counterclaim was comprised of 
several affirmative defenses to the Plaintiffs action that 
were characterized by the Dewsnups' attorney as a 
Counterclaim. A counterclaim must be a proper counterclaim 
and not merely a defense "mistakenly designated" as a 
counterclaim in order to fall under the provisions of Rule 
54(b). 6 Moore Federal Practice 2d, Section 54.35. 
A fact situation much closer to the present case is 
found in Joseph E. Bennett Co. v. Trio Industries, Inc. 306 
F2d 546 (1962). After quoting Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure in its entirety the Court concludes that 
Rule 54(b) is not applicable. 
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There has been no formal adjudication of 
the Defendant's Counterclaim and there 
has been no expressed determination and 
direction under the above rule. 
Therefore, strictly speaking, the 
Judgment entered for the Plaintiff in 
this case does not dispose of all claims 
for relief and so is not a "Final 
Decision" within the meaning of Title 28 
U.S.C. Section 1291. But the Judgment 
for the Plaintiff rests upon the finding 
that it had not broken its Contract with 
the Defendant which is the issue tendered 
by the Defendant's Counterclaim. Thus 
all claims presented have actually been 
decided. All that is lacking is a formal 
"Final Decision", i.e. the entry of a 
ministerial act of a formal Judgment of 
Dismissing the Defendant's Counterclaim. 
Under these circumstances, following the 
reasoning of Judge Clark in General Time 
Corp v. Padua Alarm Systems, Inc., 199 
F2d 351, 358 (C.A. 2 1952), Cert. Denied, 
345 U.S. 1917, 73 S. Ct. 728, 971*.ed. 
1351, (1953), we hold that the Judgment 
entered for the Plaintiff is a "Final 
Decision" appealable under Section 1291. 
Id. at Page 548. 
The Bennett Decision was followed in 1986 by the 6th 
Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Ford Motor Co. v. 
Transport Indemnity Co. 795 F2d 538 (6th Cir. 1986). The Ford 
case, supra, involved a District Courts granting of a Summary 
Judgment where the Defendant's Counterclaim was not dismissed. 
In holding that the Summary Judgment was a final decision the 
6th Circuit held as follows: 
If the District Court's ruling on one 
claim necessarily precludes an 
alternative or mutually exclusive claim, 
a final order will arise despite the lack 
of an explicit declaration by the 
District Court. Joseph E. Bennett Co. v. 
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Trio Industries, Inc. 306 F2d. 546, 548 
(1st Cir. 1962); General Time, 199 F2d. 
358. Although the District Court never 
explicitly ruled on TICO's Counterclaims, 
we are persuaded that the District Court 
rulings rejected these Counterclaims. Id 
at 543. 
The Sixth Circuit goes on to base its decision that 
the Counterclaims were rejected on two separate and distinct 
grounds. First, that Ford in its Motion for Summary Judgment 
argued that the Counterclaims were meritless both as a matter 
of fact and law and second, that the District Court's finding 
of liability upon an endorsement executed by TICO necessarily 
and implicitly rejected TICO's exoneration and recision 
claims. 
Judge Burns' granting of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment establishing the amount owed on the Notes and 
ordering the foreclosure of the security interest is mutually 
exclusive of the Dewsnups' claims that the security should not 
be foreclosed because of a mistake by the Dewsnups in 
executing the instruments creating the security. 
As in the Bennett and Ford cases, supra, Judge 
Burns' Judgment constituted a final appealable order. 
B. The Dewsnups had notice of the disposition of 
their claims and were not denied due process. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment requested a 
money Judgment against the Defendant's and that the security 
for the notes be foreclosed. In this regard, the Summary 
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Judgment Motion specifically states that there are not 
material issues of fact remaining in the case. The Dewsnups 
have never denied that they received a copy of the Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the Affidavit of Louis Timm# nor have they 
denied receiving notice of the hearing before Judge Burns. It 
was the Dewsnups and their attorney who chose to not respond 
to the Motion for Summary Judgment, to not file any opposing 
Affidavits and to not appear at the hearing on the Motion. 
The notice requirements of Rule 56(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure were complied with by the Plaintiffs 
to the letter. Dewsnups knew well in advance of the hearing 
that the Plaintiffs were claiming there were no material facts 
at issue that would preclude a money Judgment being entered 
against the Dewsnups as well as a foreclosure of the security 
on the Notes. It was the Dewsnups and their attorney's 
decision to not appear at the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and argue that their Counterclaims 
created issues of fact that would preclude the entry of 
Summary Judgment against them. The Dewsnups' claim that they 
did not receive Notice of the proceedings in this matter is 
simply not supported by the record. Their attorney did 
receive notice of the hearing. Whether his failure to appear 
at the hearing or otherwise respond to Plaintiffs Motion was 
by strategy, agreement with the Dewsnups or possible neglect 
is a matter between the Dewsnups and their attorney. The 
15 
Dewsnups cannot lay at Plaintiffs feet the Dewsnups failure to 
defend against Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion. 
II. 
JUDGE HARDING PROPERLY REFUSED TO ALLOW THE DEWSNUPS 
TO FILE AN AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM. 
A. It was within Judge Harding's discretion to 
allow or not allow the Amended Counterclaim. 
As previously discussed in this Brief Judge Harding 
correctly ruled that the Summary Judgment disposed of 
Defendant's Counterclaim. Assuming, however, arguendo that 
the Dewsnups' Counterclaim remained after the entry of the 
Summary Judgment, Judge Harding was still justified, eleven 
years later, in refusing to allow the Dewsnups to amend it. 
In Utah the decision of a Trial Court to allow 
or not allow an amended pleading has always rested within the 
Judge's sound discretion. Absent a clear abuse of discretion 
the Appellate Court will not disturb a Trial Court's ruling on 
a Motion to Amend. Girard v. Appleby, 660 P2d. 245 (Utah 
1983). See also Westley v. Farmers Insurance Exch., 663 P2d 
93 (Utah 1983) and Kelly v. Babcock & Wilcox 746 P.2d 1189 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
B. The Dewsnups proposed Amended Counterclaim is 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
Res Judicata reflects the refusal of the Courts to 
tolerate pointless litigation and is based on the premise that 
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the proper administration of justice is best served by 
limiting parties to one fair trial on an issue or cause 46 Am. 
Jur. 2d. Judgment, Section 395 (1969). 
"Res Judicata and collateral estoppel relieve 
parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, 
conserve judicial resources, and by preventing inconsistent 
decisions encourage reliance on adjudication." Alan v. 
McCurrv 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). 
The Utah Court of Appeals in the case of Copper 
State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno 735 P2d. 387, 389 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) discusses the Doctrine of res judicata and its 
related branch of collateral estoppel. Copper State Supra. 
The Court of Appeals refers to this Court's decision in Penrod 
v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P2d. 873, 874-75 (Utah 1983) 
at page 1189: 
The Doctrine of res judicata has two 
related, but distinct branches. Both 
branches, however, have the dual purpose 
of protecting litigants from the burden 
of re-litigating an identical issue with 
the same party or his privy and of 
promoting judicial economy by preventing 
needless litigation...One branch, claim 
preclusion, bars the re-litigation of a 
claim that previously has been fully 
litigated between the same parties. To 
invoke this branch of res judicata, both 
suits must involve the same parties or 
their privies and the same claim or cause 
of action. Furthermore, the first claim 
must have been litigated on the merits 
and must have resulted in a final 
judgement. Penrod 669 P2d. at 875. In 
such a case, claim preclusion prevents 
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re-litigation not only of claims actually 
litigated in the first proceeding, but 
also claims which could and should have 
been litigated in the prior action# but 
were not raised. Id. 
On March 3, 1987, the Dewsnups filed an Adversary 
Proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court, a copy of which Complaint 
is attached as Exhibit MB" to this Brief. The Dewsnups' First 
Cause of Action alleges that the Notes secured by the 
Plaintiff's Trust Deed had been paid in full and that the 
Trust Deed should therefore be removed from the record on the 
property of the Plaintiffs. After a two-day trial Judge Glen 
E. Clark dismissed the Dewsnups' claims with the exception of 
an issue concerning the ability of the Dewsnups to pay the 
fair market value of the secured property to the Plaintiffs 
and thereby redeem the property. Judge Clark later issued a 
Memorandum Decision holding that the Dewsnups could not redeem 
the property and a Judgment of Dismissal as to all of the 
Dewsnups' claims was signed by Judge Clark on August 15, 1988. 
The Dewsnups later appealed Judge Clark's ruling but only the 
part of the decision disallowing their claimed right to redeem 
the property by paying the fair market value to the 
Plaintiffs. Judge Clark's ruling has been upheld by both the 
District Court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the 
matter has now been briefed and is set to be heard on oral 
argument before the United States Supreme Court on October 15 
of this year. 
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Claim two of the Dewsnups proposed Amended 
Counterclaim is virtually identical to claim one of their 
Adversary Proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court. Based upon the 
foregoing the Dewsnups proposed Amended Counterclaim falls 
squarely within the Doctrine of res judicata or claims 
preclusion. The parties in the Dewsnups bankruptcy proceeding 
and the proposed Amended Counterclaim are identical. The 
Dewsnups Bankruptcy Court action was fully litigated and 
resulted in a Final Judgment of Dismissal. The Dewsnups did 
not appeal the Dismissal of their First Cause of Action in the 
Bankruptcy proceeding and the time for appeal has long since 
run. The other claims presented in the Dewsnups proposed 
Amended Counterclaim could and should have been litigated in 
the Bankruptcy Court action but were not raised by the 
Dewsnups. It is difficult to conceive of a fact situation 
falling more squarely within the claims preclusion branch of 
res judicata than the one presently before this Court. 
C. The filing of the Amended Counterclaim would 
have been prejudicial to Plaintiffs. 
If the filing of an amended pleading would result in 
prejudice to the adverse party it is within the discretion of 
the Trial Court to refuse to allow the amendment. The facts 
in this case make it clear that the filing by the Dewsnups of 
an Amended Counterclaim would be prejudicial to the 
Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs Judgment was entered in 1980, some 
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eleven (11) years prior to the Dewsnups' Motion to Amend their 
Counterclaim, If the Dewsnups' Counterclaim still exists, 
they have allowed it to sit for such an extended period of 
time that# not only has the Trial Judge who originally heard 
the case retired, one of the Counterclaimants, namely Lamar 
Dewsnup, is deceased. The Dewsnups eleven (11) year delay in 
bringing their Motion to Amend has virtually made it 
impossible for the Plaintiffs to now conduct discovery into 
the allegations made in their proposed Amended Counterclaim. 
D. The Dewsnup's Bankruptcies did not preclude 
them from a timely Motion to amend their Counterclaim. 
In their Brief the Dewsnups state that the filing of 
their bankruptcies precluded them from a Motion to Amend their 
Counterclaim. This claim is simply not accurate. The 
Dewsnups correctly state that Section 323(a) of the Bankruptcy 
Act names the Bankruptcy Trustee as the "representative of the 
estate" and authorizes the Trustee to act on behalf of the 
bankruptcy estate. Further, the Dewsnups point out that 
Bankruptcy Rule 6009 provides that "(W)ith or without Court 
approval the Trustee...may prosecute... any pending action or 
proceeding by...the Debtor." What the Dewsnups fail to point 
out is that the Bankruptcy filed by the Dewsnups on April 23, 
1981, the day after Judge Burns signed the Summary Judgment 
and Decree of Foreclosure, was a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. The 
significance of this omitted fact is that under a Chapter 11 
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Bankruptcy the Dewsnups were acting as Trustees of the Estate 
and were empowered with the right to prosecute any pending 
actions on behalf of themselves. The truth is that from April 
23, 1981, until June 27, 1984, the date the Dewsnups filed 
their Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, the Dewsnups had the right to 
prosecute their Counterclaim if they believed that one still 
existed. 
In addition, the Dewsnups later filed an adversary 
proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court setting out several of the 
claims outlined in their proposed Amended Counterclaim. (The 
Bankruptcy Adversary proceeding is discussed at subpoint D of 
this argument.) 
Finally, while it is technically true that the 
Dewsnups were precluded after the date of filing their Chapter 
7 Bankruptcy from bringing their Motion in the District Court 
until the Trustee abandoned the claim, they fail to give the 
reasons why the claim was not abandoned until 1991. First, it 
is doubtful that the Trustee even knew about the claim since 
it was not listed by the Dewsnups in their bankruptcy 
schedules as an asset of the estate. Second, the Dewsnups 
were treating Judge Burns' Judgment as being final and were 
involved in an adversary proceeding to void the same Judgment 
that they now claim is not final. It was not until the 
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Dewsnups lost their bankruptcy case, that they decided to 
pursue the argument that the Judgment was not a final order. 
III. 
JUDGE HARDING WAS CORRECT IN REFUSING TO RECONSIDER 
AND SET ASIDE OR CERTIFY AS FINAL THE SUMMARY Judgment. 
The Summary Judgment was not properly before the 
Court for reconsideration. Utah Courts have never recognized 
a Motion to Reconsider and Set Aside a Summary Judgment unless 
said Motion is brought pursuant to Rule 60 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. In the case of Peay v. Peay, 607 P2d 841 
(Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court in rejecting a Motion for 
Reconsideration of a Court Order and Motion for Relief from 
Final Judgment quoted with approval the decision of the 
Supreme Court in Utah State Employees Credit Union v. Riding 
24 Utah 2d 211, 469 P2d 1 (Utah 1970): 
Under the record here, we are unaware of 
any such Motion under our rules... 
We think the Motion To Reconsider the 
Motion to Vacate the Judgment is abortive 
under the Rules...We conclude that the 
Judgment of Foreclosure, unappealed from, 
must stand absent any timely appeal. At 
P 843. 
The Court goes on to quote with favor its ruling in Drurv v. 
Lunceford 415 P2d, 662 (Utah 1966) where the Court ruled as 
follows: 
When (a Motion has been made) and the 
Court has ruled upon the Motion, if the 
party ruled against were permitted to go 
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beyond the Rules, make a Motion for 
Reconsideration, and persuade the Judge 
to reverse himself, the question arises, 
why should not the other party who is now 
ruled against be permitted to make a 
Motion for re-reconsideration, asking the 
Court to again reverse himself? 
...(T)he new Rules of Procedure...were 
designated to provide a pattern of 
regularity of procedure which the parties 
and the Courts could follow and rely 
upon...in order to avoid such a state of 
indecision for both the Judge and the 
parties, practical expediency demands 
that there be some finality to the 
actions of the Court; and he should not 
be in the position of having the further 
duty of acting as a Court of review upon 
his own ruling. (Citation omitted.) Id. 
at page 843. 
The Dewsnups received Notice of the Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment as well as notice of the hearing date on said 
Motion. After reviewing th€* Court files including the Motion 
and Affidavit of Louis Timm# Judge Burns executed an Order 
granting Plaintiffs Summary Judgment and ordering the property 
securing the Dewsnups notes to be foreclosed. All parties 
involved, including the Dewsnups recognized the Summary 
Judgment as being a final Order. Some eleven years later for 
a different District Court Judge to reconsider and set aside 
the Order would result in the frustrating results condemned by 
the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Haner v. Haner 373 P2d. 
577 (Utah 1962). 
...(T)o reopen a case just because a 
party persists in asserting and 
attempting to prove that his version of 
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the dispute was the truth and that of the 
opponents was false would open the door 
to a repetition of that procedure, 
whoever won the next time; and thus 
keeping the dispute going ad infinitum 
with no way of determining when the 
merry-go-round of the lawsuit would end. 
This would involve not only a waste of 
time, energy and expense but also would 
result in such uncertainty as to peoples 
rights that the very purpose of a 
lawsuit, the settling of disputes and 
putting them at rest, would be defeated. 
Resort to the Courts would be frustrating 
and impractical unless there were some 
point at which decisions became final so 
that the parties could place reliance 
thereon, leave their troubles behind and 
proceed to the future... Id at Page 579. 
Judge Harding was clearly justified in refusing to grant a 
Motion that was so clearly outside the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
For more than eleven years the Plaintiffs have 
attempted to collect amounts owed to them by the Dewsnups. 
During this time the Dewsnups have been represented by at 
least six different attorneys. The Dewsnups' claims have been 
presented to Trial Judges in State Court and Federal 
Bankruptcy Court. Judge Burns granted Judgment in favor of 
Plaintiffs and against the Dewsnups in 1981. From 1981 until 
the Dewsnups filed the Motions which are the subject of this 
appeal all parties, including the Dewsnups, as well as the 
Dewsnups' attorneys, have treated Judge Burns' ruling as a 
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Final Judgment. If Judge Burns' ruling was not final, 
literally hundreds of hours and tens of thousands of dollars 
have been wasted by the parties in the Dewsnups' Bankruptcy 
proceedings as well as the recent proceedings in this case. 
The Dewsnups have both used and abused the state and 
federal judicial systems for more than a decade. Justice 
requires that this matter mercifully come to an end. Judge 
Harding's ruling on the Dewsnups' Motions was correct and 
accordingly Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Dewsnups' 
Appeal should be dismissed in its entirety by this honorable 
Court. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of September, 1991. 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C. 
Michael Z. Hc_ 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs\Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on this 6th day of 
September, 1991, four (4) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing APPELLEE'S BRIEF were hand delivered to Russell A. 
Cline, 123 Second Ave. T-2, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103. 
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INDEX TO EXHIBITS 
Exhibit A - Motion for Summary Judgment 
Exhibit B - Amended Complaint to Determine Validity of Lien 
Exhibit C - Judgment of Dismissal 
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"EXHIBIT A" 
WENDELL E. BENNETT 
AND ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys at Law 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
370 East 500 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephones 532-7846 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE Or UTAH 
—-oooOooo—-• 
LOUIS L. TINM, et al, x NOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs 
vs. 
T. LAMAR DEWSNUP, et al* 
'Defendants. : Civil No* 7191 
~-oooOooo— 
COMES NOW the plaintiffs above named, and moves the 
court, pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for a 
summary judgment against the defendants Dewsnup for the principal 
sum of $49,966.21, with interest thereon at either the rate of 10% 
or 18%, as the court may determine is due as a matter of law from 
June 2, 1980 until paid, and for attorney's fees in an amount in 
excess of $5,000.00, which will be testified to by legal counsel 
for the plaintiffs at the time of the hearing on the motion for 
summary judgment, and for the plaintiffs* costs of court herein 
incurred. 
This motion is made on the grounds and for the reason 
that there are not material issues of fact remaining in this case, 
and as a matter of law the defendants Dewsnup are indebted to the 
plaintiffs in the sum of $49,966.21 in principal, plus interest, 
attorney's fees, and court costs, as a result of their breach of 
contract on promissory notes, securred by real property and water 
rights. Since the commencement of this action, the defendants 
Dewsnup have paid $147,652.36 in what was believed to be the first 
part of a two part settlement, however, they have not paid the 
0000'ji* 
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remaining $49,966.21 principal, or the interest and attorney's 
fees* The files and records of the court will indicate that the 
defendants are in default, and that the amount set out in the 
affidavit of Louis L. Tlnm, attached hereto, and by thia reference 
made a part hereof, reflect that the defendants have a remaining 
balance due and owing the plaintiffs as above set out, and there 
are no material issues of fact that dispute that, and the plain-
tiffs are, therefore, entitled to summary judgment against the 
defendants, and each of them in the principal sum of $49,966.21, 
plus interest thereon from June 2, 1980 until paid, attorney's 
fees incurred, court costs incurred, and for such other and 
further relief as the court finds dtfe and owing. 
DATED this V ^ ^ a y of // j/Z T,P ' ^ . 1981. 
WENDELL E. BENNETT & ASSOCIATES 
Y 
WENDELL E. BENNETT 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the fore-
going on the\Jrt0(&*Y of /1 \(Z ^ / L w 1981 to Robert C. 
Pillerup, 1325 South 800 Eastr-~&uite 305, Orem, Utah 84057. 
l\n../C\ l nlt.Q, J&ftUr., 
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"EXHIBIT B" 
William Thomas Thurman 
Scott C. Pierce 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Suite 1200, Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
In re: : Bankruptcy No. 84C-01746 
LAMAR DEWSNUP and : 
ALETHA DEWSNUP, 
Debtors. : 
LAMAR DEWSNUP and : Adversary Proceeding No. 
ALETHA DEWSNUP, 87PC-0116 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
LOUIS L. TIMM, JOHN NEIUWLAND 
and FLOYD M. CHILDS, Trustees 
of the 
UNITED PRECISION MACHINE AND 
ENGINEERING COMPANY, PROFIT-
SHARING TRUST, ABCO INSURANCE 
AGENCY, INC., JOSEPH L. 
HENROID, as Trustee for the 
Annette Jacob Trust, 
Defendants. 
PARTIES AND JURISDICTION 
Plaintiffs complain of Defendants as follows: 
1. The Plaintiffs are residents of the State of Utah. 
A M E N D E D 
COMPLAINT TO DETERMINE 
VALIDITY OF LIEN 
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2. Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that 
Defendants, Louis L. Timm, John Neiuwland and Floyd M. Childs, 
Trustees of the United Precision Machine and Engineering Company 
Profit-Sharing Trust are residents of the State of Utah. 
3. Upon information and belief Plaintiffs allege that 
Defendant, ABCO Insurance Agency, Inc., is incorporated under 
the laws of the State of Utah and has its principal place of 
business in the State of Utah. 
4. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that 
Defendant, Joseph L. Henroid, as Trustee for the Annette Jacob 
Trust, is a resident of the State of Utah. 
5. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1334 and 28 U.S.C. §157(b). 
6. This is a core proceeding under the meaning of 28 
U.S.C. 5157(b)(2)(K). 
7. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. 
§§1408 and 1409. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
8. On or about June 1, 1978, Plaintiffs executed a 
Trust Deed with Defendants as beneficiary and Plaintiffs as 
Trustor in the amount of $119,000.00. 
9. On or about December 3, 1980, Plaintiffs paid in 
full, the underlying note which is secured by the Trust Deed 
alleged in paragraph 8 of this Complaint. 
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10. The debt owed by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants 
arising from the note secured by the June lf 1978 Trust Deed has 
been satisfied in full. The Trust Deed should have been re-
leased and is no longer valid. 
11. The Trust Deed dated June 1, 1978 with Plaintiffs 
as Trustor and Defendants as beneficiaries, should be removed 
from the record on the property of the Plaintiffs. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
12. This Second Cause of Action is alleged alternative-
ly and/or in supplement to the First Cause of Action in this 
Complaint. Therefore, the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 
through 11 of this Complaint are realleged and made part of this 
Second Cause of Action. 
13. In addition to the Trust Deed mentioned in Plain-
tiffs1 First Cause of Action, Defendants claim to have a judg-
ment lien on Defendants' property in the amount of $49,966.21, 
plus interest from April, 1981, costs and attorney's fees. 
14. Defendants claim that the $49,966.21 judgment is 
also secured by the Trust Deed mentioned in the First Cause of 
Action of this Complaint. 
15. Defendants claim that their Trust Deed and judgment 
lien attach to Plaintiffs' property located near Deseret, Utah, 
specifically described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto, and 
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Plaintiffs* property located near Oak City, Utah, specifically 
described in Exhibit "B" attached hereto. 
16. The value of the 160 acres of Plaintiffs' property 
> 
located near Deseret, Utah, as of the time of the filing of this 
action, was $24,000.00. 
17. The value of Defendants1 property located near Oak 
City of the 56 acres of Plaintiffs1 property located near Oak 
City, Utah, as of the time of the filing of this action was 
$8,500.00. 
18. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §506(d), the security 
interests of Defendants, including the Trust Deed and judgment 
lien, are invalid to the extent that they exceed the value of 
the debtors1 property upon which they attach. The security 
interests of the Defendants are invalid to the extent they are 
unsecured. 
19. The security interests of the Defendants can be 
satisfied in full by Plaintiffs remitting to the Defendants the 
fair market value of the property upon which the security 
interest attaches. The remainder of Defendants' claims against 
Plaintiffs are unsecured. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
20. This cause of action is alleged as an alternative 
and/or supplement to the first two causes of action alleged in 
this Complaint. Therefore, Plaintiffs reallege the allegations 
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made in paragraphs 1 through 19 and incorporate them as part of 
this cause of action. 
21. Defendants obtained a judgment against Plaintiffs 
on April 24, 1981. 
22. Plaintiffs filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case in 
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah on 
April 22, 1981. 
23. The judgment and judgment lien obtained by 
Defendants in April of 1981 are void under 11 U.S.C. §362 as 
they were entered after Plaintiffs filed their Petition in 
bankruptcy. 
WHEREFORE, debtors pray that: 
1. The Court enter an order removing the June 1, 1978 
Trust Deed, with Defendants as beneficiary, from the property of 
the debtors because the underlying note has been satisfied and 
the Trust Deed is invalid. 
2. The Court enter an order avoiding Defendants' 
security interest on the real property of the Plaintiffs to the 
extent that the security interest exceeds the value of the real 
property under 11 U.S.C. §506(d). 
3. The Court enter an order voiding the April 24, 1981 
judgment in favor of Defendants under 11 U.S.C. §362. 
4. For such other relief as the Court deems appropri-
ate under the circumstances. 
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DATED this .^ day of March, 1987. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
iam Thomas Thurman 
fott C. Pierce 
Attorneys for Debtors 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, this A"^ day of 
March, 1987, to the following: 
Louis L. Timm, Trustee 
United Precision Machine & Engineering Co. 
Profit-Sharing Trust 
4365 Mark Read 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Joseph L. Henroid, Trustee 
Annette Jacob Trust 
1900 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ABCO Insurance Agency 
c/o Krehl Smith, President 
2160 Scenic Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Wendell E. Bennett 
Attorney at Law 
448 East 400 South, Sutie 304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
SCP11 
N^flVJiW-tfVfPC 
ocor^ 
4 Parcel 3: 
, -}* The Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter; the Northwest quarter of the 
Southeast quarter; the Southeast quarter of the Northwest quarter and the 
Northeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 13, Township 18 South, 
Range 8 Kest, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM that portion lying within the Boundaries of the County Road 
right-of-way, 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM (parcel 3) all rights of way, stock trails, ditches and 
canals, gravel pits and gravel beds. 
***** 
EXHIBIT ,fAff 
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The land referred to in this report is situated in the 
County of Millard t State of Utah, and is described as follows: 
Parcel 1: 
Beginning 9L80 feet West of the Southeast corner of the. Southwest quarter of 
Section 4, Township 17 South., Range 4 West, Salt Lake. Base and Meridian, thence 
North 1320 feet; thence West 1264 feet; thence South. 625 feet, more or less, to 
the North boundary of Road right-of-way; thence Southeasterly along the Road 
right-of-way 541 feet; thence South 470 feet; thence East 84Q feet to. the joint 
of beginning. 
Parcel 2; 
Beginning 180 feet West of the Northeast corner of the Horthwest quarter of 
Section 9, Township 17 South, Range 4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence 
South 1320 feet; thence West 840 feet; thence North. 1320 feet; thence East 840 
feet to the point of beginning. 
EXCEPTING THERETROM that portion lying within the. Boundaries of the County Road 
right-of-way. 
EXHIBIT "B 
"EXHIBIT C" 
MICHAEL Z. HAYES - 1432 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN 6 HAYES, P.C. 
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260 
2180 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OP .UTAH 
In re: 
LAMAR DEWSNUP and 
ALETHA DEWSNUP, 
Debtors. 
LAMAR DEWSNUP and 
ALETHA DEWSNUP, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LOUIS L. TIMM, et al.. 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
: Bankruptcy Case 84C-01746 
: Civil Proceeding No. 87PC-0116 
x 
x 
Plaintiffs' Adversary Proceeding case on for hearing 
before the Honorable Glen B. Clark on Thursday, June 25, 1987, at 
9:00 o'clock a.n. Plaintiffs were represented by William Thomas 
Thurman and Scott C. Pierce of McKay, Burton & Thurman, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. Defendants were represented by Michael Z. Hayes of 
Mazuran, Verhaaren & Hayes, Salt Lake City, Utah. The Court, 
after having reviewed the file and having heard testimony from 
the parties and after having taken the matter under advisement 
1 00023.; 
and subsequently filing its published Memorandum Opinion, which 
is incorporated into this Order by reference, hereby Orders, 
Adjudges and Decrees as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs* Adversary Proceeding is dismissed in 
its entirety with prejudice; 
2. All parties are to bear their own costs. 
DATED this )S<t> day of August, 19 
jSI 
U TH«S ORDER/JUDGMENT P8
*ENTERED 
JUDGE GLEN E 
Chief Judge 
United Stat 
CLA 
1 
t 
Bank06WmQ?u?&< 
U.S. BANKRUPTCY CC.-tT 
MAILING CERTIFICATE _____ 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Judgment of Dismissal to the following this {"^ day of August 
1988. 
William Thomas Thurman, Esq. 
Scott C. Pierce, Esq. 
McKAY, BURTON 6 THURMAN 
Suite 1200 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Michael Z. Hayes 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES 
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260 
2180 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
*%£ OQJ 
£tjr> 
% 
Secretary to Judge Clark 
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